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InTroduCTIon
An interesting dynamic has developed in the United States con-
cerning the Inter-American Convention on Arbitration (the “Panama 
Convention”). Courts in this country have overwhelmingly declined 
to interpret and implement the Panama Convention to disputes con-
currently governed by the New York Convention.2 The hesitation of 
U.S. courts to apply, interpret, and build case law under the Panama 
Convention begs the question of when and in what context the Panama 
Convention remains relevant to international commercial arbitration in 
the United States.
This Article briefly questions and explores the current relevancy 
of the Panama Convention in commercial arbitration disputes between 
1 Danielle Dean and Chelsea Masters are JD candidates at the American University 
Washington College of Law.
2 Banco de Seguros del Estado v. Mut. Marine Offices, Inc., 257 F. Supp. 2d 681, 
684-86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Emp’r Ins. of Wausu v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado, 
199 F.3d 937, 942 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the Panama Convention incorporates 
the New York Convention and that, even though the Panama Convention applies, the 
court looks to case law construing the meaning of the New York Convention as a 
means to interpret the Panama Convention).
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citizens of the United States and Latin American countries. Jan van 
den Berg’s (“Van den Berg”) 1989 article not only discussed the pos-
sible interpretations of the Panama Convention but also predicted how 
U.S. courts would ultimately apply such instrument over the years.3 
Employing van den Berg’s framework as a model, this article analyzes 
the development of case law involving the Panama Convention in U.S. 
courts since 2005.4
First, this Article discusses the history of arbitration in Latin 
America. Additionally, it highlights some reasons why the U.S. adopted 
the Panama Convention as a regional arbitration instrument closely 
resembling the New York Convention. Second, it examines how the 
New York and Panama Conventions interact with one another under 
U.S. law, observing that the former continues to infringe on matters 
originally intended to be covered by the latter. Finally, and more con-
cretely perhaps, this Article delves into three key stages of the arbitral 
process—action to compel, determination of jurisdiction, and award 
enforcement—and purports to explicate the role and function granted 
to the Panama Convention therein. More broadly, the present work 
desires to stress how accurate Professor van den Berg’s seminal work 
on the Panama Convention was, whose analytical framework continues 
to govern.
I. Background
A. Development of Arbitration in Latin America
The United States codified two conventions relevant to commercial 
arbitration between the United States and most Latin American coun-
tries: the Panama Convention5 and the 1958 New York Convention on 
3 Albert J. van den Berg, The New York Convention 1958 and Panama Convention 
1975: Redundancy or Compatibility?, 5 Arb. Int’l 214 (1989). Professor van den 
Berg is a world-renown arbitrator and arbitration expert who co-authored the highly 
regarded “Preliminary Draft Convention on the International Enforcement of 
Arbitration Agreements and Awards” (the Miami Draft).
4 For articles focusing on case law interpreting the Panama Convention before 
2005, Helena Tavares Erickson et al., Looking Back, And Ahead: The Panama 
Convention After 30 Years, 23 AlternAtIves to hIGh cost lItIG. 184 (2005); Robin 
Miller, Construction And Application Of Inter–American Convention On International 
Commercial Arbitration, 1 A.l.r. FeD. 2d 309 (2005).
5 Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 9 U.S.C. §§ 
301-07 (1990).
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the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the “New 
York Convention”).6 Perhaps because the Panama Convention was 
meant to mirror the terms, provisions, and system implemented by the 
New York Convention,7 one must observe that even in those sections in 
which the two instruments differ,8 Congress has indicated—and courts 
have acknowledged—that both instruments were meant to be construed 
and applied in the same manner.9
First ratified by the United States,10 the New York Convention was 
intended to unify nations and forego regional standards for handling 
arbitration disputes by adopting a standardized arbitration framework, 
thereby doing away with national peculiarities concerning enforcement 
requirements and procedures.11 However, before 1975, many Latin 
American countries refused to sign on to the New York Convention,12 
prompting the United States to adopt the Panama Convention to pro-
mote international commercial arbitration in Latin America.13 For 
Latin America, ratifying the Panama Convention symbolized a marked 
compromise14 in that it was a complete departure from its traditional 
hostility toward U.S. foreign policy. Most importantly, this ratification 
6 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 
U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
7 See Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 
41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that the “legislative history of the Inter-American 
Convention’s implementing statute clearly demonstrates that Congress intended the 
Inter-American Convention to reach the same results as those reached under the New 
York Convention”).
8 van den Berg supra note 3, at 221.
9 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Banco Do Estado Do Rio Grande do Sul, S.A., 04 CIV. 1550 
(DLC), 2004 WL 1398437, (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2004) (rejecting plaintiff ’s argument 
that the slight difference in wording requires a different interpretation of the Panama 
Convention, instead holding the Panama Convention is meant to be interpreted in line 
with the New York Convention).
10 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08.
11 nigel blaCkaby et al., Overview of Regional Developments, in international 
arbitration in latin ameriCa 3 (Nigel Blackaby et al. eds., 2002).
12 van den Berg, supra note 3, at 215.
13 Id. at 221.
14 The implementing legislation to the Panama Convention states that “[a]rbitral 
decisions or awards made in the territory of a foreign State shall, on the basis of 
reciprocity, be recognized and enforced under this chapter only if that State has ratified 
or acceded to the Inter-American Convention” thereby not recognizing all foreign 
arbitration awards who are not party to this regional arbitration convention. 9 U.S.C. § 
304.
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removed “the philosophical objection to arbitration as a means of dis-
pute resolution,”15 while sustaining at the same time consistency with 
respect to the notorious—and investment-tailored—“Calvo” doctrine.16 
For the United States, ratifying the Panama Convention meant bringing 
Latin America into the fold of its own international commercial arbitra-
tion framework as well as creating a safer environment for many U.S. 
corporations to invest in the Latin American market.17 In fact, since U.S. 
adoption and codification of the Panama Convention, some observed 
the rise in the use of arbitration clauses in commercial contracts and an 
increase in the number of investment disputes involving Latin American 
parties.18
B. Implementation and Interpretation of the Panama 
Convention in the United States
Since its ratification, the interpretation of the Panama Convention by 
U.S. courts has fallen in line with Professor van den Berg’s predictions,19 
in that the absence of key provisions regarding the enforcement of 
arbitration agreements or awards has prevented the jurisprudential 
development of an autonomous case law.20 Indeed, in the long run, the 
successful enforcement of many arbitral disputes would require a more 
solid normative matrix to support its evolution. Thus, Congress and 
U.S. federal courts developed two legal solutions to face the issue. First, 
Congress codified the New York and Panama Conventions in a manner 
that rendered them interrelated with the FAA, which contains explicit 
15 van den Berg, supra note 3 at 221.
16 A foreign policy doctrine holding that jurisdiction in international investment 
disputes lies with the country in which the investment is located. Alwyn V. Freeman, 
Recent Aspects of the Calvo Doctrine and the Challenge of International Law, 40 Am. 
JournAl Int’l lAW 1, 121-147 (1946).
17 132 Cong. reC. S15,774 (daily ed. Oct. 9, 1986) (stating that “the United States of 
America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and 
enforcement of only those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State” 
upon its ratification).
18 blaCkaby et al., supra note 11.
19 Id.
20 van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221.
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provisions for compelling arbitration.21 Second, while incorporating 
the Panama Convention into the United States Code, Congress virtu-
ally duplicated the already codified New York Convention’s language, 
thereby guiding U.S. Courts to achieve the same results regardless of 
whether the case was tried under the New York or Panama Convention.22 
U.S. courts have generally utilized this second legal solution in one of 
two ways. First, courts reasoned that, since the New York and Panama 
Conventions were codified in such a way as to bring about the same nor-
mative outcome, the language of the New York Convention should gov-
ern instances where both instruments concurrently applied.23 Otherwise, 
in rarer circumstances, U.S. Courts have directly cited Chapter Three of 
Title Nine, under which the Panama Convention is codified.24 When pre-
sented with an arbitration agreement that falls under the auspices of the 
Panama Convention, courts generally state that because the New York 
and Panama Conventions were codified in the same manner and pursu-
ant to and identical rationale, U.S. jurisprudence should favor the appli-
cation of the New York Convention in lieu of the Panama Convention.25
The present paper will shed some light on the arbitral issues where 
the Panama Convention retains exclusive governance and highlight 
instances where U.S. courts have utilized the New York Convention 
despite the applicability of the Panama Convention.
21 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 208, 307; Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 
F.3d 1289, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 2005); Martinez v. Columbian Emeralds, Inc., 2009 
WL 57847 at *12-3 (V.I.) (dissent) for an exemplary analysis of how to untangle 
the interrelated nature of Title 9. Note also that 9 U.S.C. §§ 208 and 307 stipulate 
that Chapter One of the FAA applies residually to supplement provisions of both 
Conventions where the FAA does not conflict. FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 4, 208, 307 (1947).
22 H.R. rep. no. 501 at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678. Productos 
Mercantiles E. Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, 23 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) and 
Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) 
for cases basing interpretation of Panama on this intention.
23 Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 45. Note that there has been some debate as to 
whether the Panama Convention should be interpreted when the same provisions under 
the New York convention are also applicable. E.g. Nicor Int’l Corp v. El Paso Corp., 
292 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1371-72 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (describing in several paragraphs that 
Panama applies to the Parties only to further the use of the New York Convention).
24 ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 334.
25 Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97.
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II. Panama Convention as Interpreted in U.S. Case Law
A. Action To Compel Arbitration
United States courts have shown a tendency to rely on the New York 
Convention to compel parties to arbitrate a dispute.26 Only the New York 
Convention stipulates that courts in contracting states must stay their 
proceedings and are required to refer contracting parties in a qualified 
dispute to arbitration.27 Because the Panama Convention does not arm 
the parties with such actionable rights, U.S. courts commonly employ 
the New York Convention as a means to compel parties to arbitrate 
their disputes.28 Considering the inability of the Panama Convention to 
independently compel arbitration, U.S. courts have generally tied the 
language of the New York Convention, as well as its jurisprudence, to 
arbitration clauses arising from the Panama Convention in lieu of its 
missing provisions.29
Albeit merely in its dissent, Martinez v. Colombian Emeralds, Inc. 
is one of the only cases to discuss whether the Panama Convention, as 
codified under Chapter Three, is equipped to autonomously allow courts 
to compel arbitration.30 In Martinez, the appellant was challenging a 
trial court’s action compelling him to arbitrate his dispute. Rather than 
considering the order to compel arbitration, the majority overturned the 
lower court based on non-compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.31 Despite believing that the Supreme Court of the Virgin 
Islands lacked jurisdiction in this case, Justice Swan, an associate justice 
of the Virgin Islands’ Supreme Court and former labor arbitrator, thor-
oughly evaluated the basis for deciding whether to compel arbitration 
under the Panama Convention or New York Convention.32 This is where 
Martinez proves unique. Although inevitably finding that the application 
of the New York Convention was appropriate, Justice Swan noted that 
26 van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221.
27 Id.; 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (“The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an 
action in a matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement within the 
meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties 
to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or 
incapable of being performed.”).
28 Nicor, 292 F. Supp. 2d at 1372 (2003).
29 Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97.
30 Martinez v. Columbian Emeralds, Inc., 2009 WL 57847 at *6 (V.I. Mar. 4, 2009).
31 Martinez, 2009 WL 57847 at *6.
32 Id. at *12.
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under Chapter Three of Title Nine, courts could implement the Panama 
Convention to compel arbitration.33 Section 303 of Title Nine is similar 
to the New York Convention’s “Order to Compel Arbitration” codified 
under section 206 of the same title.34 Interestingly enough, no other 
court has chosen to directly link the language of Panama as codified in 
9 U.S.C. § 303 to an action to compel arbitration.35 This may be due to 
courts having more jurisprudence under the New York Convention.36
Another issue that has troubled both the New York and Panama 
Conventions pertains to whether a court may ever allow a party to avoid 
arbitration. The Second Circuit considered this very issue in Republic 
of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp.37 In this case, the plaintiffs were 
not seeking to compel arbitration, but rather asked the Court to prevent 
arbitration, as well as grant them injunctive and declaratory relief.38 
After reviewing numerous cases interpreting both the Panama and New 
York Conventions, the Court decided that there was “little or no basis in 
Second Circuit case law for invocation of the New York Convention or 
the Inter-American Convention by a party seeking to avoid arbitration, 
rather than compel or aid it.”39 Inevitably, the court had no choice but to 
uphold the stay of the proceedings pending further investigation of the 
laws of Ecuador.40
Despite these two more recent exceptions, Professor van den Berg’s 
analysis of the Panama Convention remains essentially true: the Panama 
Convention is hardly ever invoked to decide whether to compel arbi-
tration despite being codified in the United States Code. Whatever the 
33 Id. at *13.
34 9 U.S.C. §§ 206, 303 (“A court having jurisdiction under this chapter may direct 
that arbitration be held in accordance with the agreement at any place therein provided 
for, whether that place is within or without the United States.”).
35 Martinez, 2009 WL 57847 at *13.
36 See, e.g., Emp’r Ins. of Wausu v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado, 199 F.3d 937, 
942 (7th Cir. 1999) (providing case law to support the court’s argument even though 
the case law interprets the New York Convention instead of the analogous provisions 
of Panama Convention).
37 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). In this case, the Second Circuit did not 
dispute whether the New York Convention and/or the Panama Convention could be 
cited to compel arbitration although they clearly preferred to interpret the case based 
in the New York Convention as there is more jurisprudence regarding interpretation of 
this Convention than there is in Panama.
38 Id. at 348-9.
39 Id. at 349.
40 Id. at 380.
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reasoning may be, United States Courts generally continue to evaluate 
arbitration agreements under the New York Convention, even in cases in 
which they could resort to the Panama Convention.
B. Acquiring Federal Jurisdiction: Invoking the Panama 
Convention along with 28 U.S.C. § 1331
Many parties instrumentalize the Panama Convention as a tool to 
remove a case to the federal court system. Indeed, the invocation of a 
treaty renders their case removable as a federal question pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1331.41 Despite jurisdictional disagreements being uncom-
mon in international commercial arbitration disputes, some courts 
have approached the jurisdictional question.42 The latter has resulted in 
analysis similar to those employed by federal courts when examining 
questions involving treaties.43 However, federal courts have differed in 
their use of the Panama Convention to establish jurisdiction.
Although jurisdiction based on federal question was unchallenged, 
the Second Circuit made a point of evaluating the issue in Republic of 
Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp. The court found that a federal ques-
tion existed in this case regardless of whether the New York or Panama 
Conventions applied.44 It further elaborated on the issue of removal, stat-
ing that the Panama Convention, as implemented under 9 U.S.C. § 302, 
allows the original-jurisdiction and removal provisions of Chapter Two 
of the New York Convention to apply. Again, consistent with the trend 
in U.S. courts, the court deferred to the New York Convention to inter-
pret an agreement governed by the Panama Convention.45 However, this 
is not because more jurisprudence existed to support a court evaluation 
based on the New York Convention (as sometimes occurs with issues 
like compelling arbitration).46 In establishing appropriate jurisdiction, 
41 Removal of cases based on federal question is governed under 28 U.S.C § 1441 
(2011).
42 ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
43 Id. at 334; Huntsman Corp. v. Int’l Risk Ins. Co., No. H-08-1542, 2008 WL 
4453170, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2008); Higgins v. SPX Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 
2006 WL 1008677, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
44 ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
45 Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1296-7 (11th Cir. 2005); Higgins, 2006 
WL 1008677, at *2.
46 Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1296-97 (demonstrating how a court can compel arbitration 
based on the wording of the Panama Convention but the jurisprudence of the New 
York Convention).
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neither the strict language of the Panama Convention nor the New York 
Convention as codified in the United States Code independently estab-
lish appropriate jurisdiction or removal procedures.47 Therefore, the 
language of New York proved indispensable in this situation.
C. Enforcement of Arbitral Awards
The majority of cases interpreting the Panama Convention do so in 
the context of enforcing an arbitral award.48 Professor van den Berg’s 
1989 article highlights the fact that “no major conflict between both 
Conventions would seem to arise, except with the applicability of the 
Inter-American Commercial Arbitration Commission (“IACAC”) rules” 
which has held true within all U.S. case law discussing both treaties.49 
Additionally, Professor van den Berg suggested that the U.S. legislation 
implementing the Panama Convention would lead courts to interpret 
and apply the Panama Convention over the New York Convention.50 
While Professor van den Berg is technically correct, courts persist in 
avoiding the Panama Convention, finding it unnecessary because the 
47 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07; 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16.
48 U.S. for use and Benefit of Immobiliaria y Constructora Mexcanusa v. Caddell 
Construction, No. EP-09-CV-376-KC, 2010 WL 2622939, at *1 (W.D. Tex. June 25, 
2010).
49 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2007); 
van den Berg, supra note 3, at 224-28 (“It should be noted that the provisions in the 
IACAC Rules are not limited to the arbitral proceedings but also include provisions on 
the method of appointing arbitrators (Arts. 6–8). The effect of Article 3 of the Panama 
Convention then is that, in case the parties have not agreed on a method of appointing 
arbitrators, the method laid down in the IACAC Rules is to be followed. Such effect 
constitutes the logical complement to Article 2 of the Panama Convention which 
provides that the parties are free to agree on the method of appointing arbitrators. If 
no such agreement is made, Article 3 comes to rescue by implying that the method of 
appointment laid down in the IACAC Rules shall be applied.”).
50 van den Berg, supra note 3, at 221, 225 (“A rather unusual treaty provision, which 
has no counterpart in the New York Convention, is to be found in Article 3, reading: 
The IACAC Arbitration Rules, as amended in 1978, are virtually identical with the 
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL) of 1976. Article 3 is very important for Latin America where local laws 
on arbitration contain many types of provisions that may impede a smooth functioning 
of the arbitration. Article 3 establishes that the agreement of the parties on arbitration 
matters ranks first and that in the absence of such agreement the arbitration is to be 
conducted in accordance with the modern IACAC Rules which are specifically geared 
to international arbitration. In neither case, do the local rules of procedure apply since 
provisions in treaties prevail over them.”).
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New York Convention already embodies not only all the relevant provi-
sions, but also more tested provisions—and thus a more secured case 
law.51 Such reluctance to resort to the Panama Convention often leads 
courts to inaccurately apply the New York Convention to the enforce-
ment of awards unless there is a conflict between the two conventions.52
When the United States ratified the Panama Convention, it made a 
reservation53 stipulating that unless certain criteria were met, the Panama 
Convention and the IACAC rules should not govern the enforcement 
of an award.54 Accordingly, if these criteria were not satisfied nor met, 
the New York Convention’s provisions would be incorporated into the 
Panama Convention as codified in the U.S. Code.55 However, this reser-
vation has no effect if the parties have expressly contracted otherwise.56
Courts generally conduct a three-step test when a party seeks to 
enforce a foreign arbitral award in the United States under either the 
New York or Panama Conventions.57 First, they must determine whether 
51 TermoRio, 487 F.3d at 929.
52 Two cases interpret the Panama Convention on its own provisions and both cases 
involved the parties’ use of the IACAC rules. This is consistent with this article’s 
assessment that courts will continue to apply the New York Convention unless there 
is a conflict between the Panama Convention and the New York Convention. See 
Americatel El Salvador, S.A. de C.V. C.V. v. Compania de Telecomunicaciones de El 
Salvador, S.A. de C.V., No. 07-21940-CIV, 2008 WL 1805476, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 
2008) (applying the Panama Convention to the parties’ agreement to use an amended 
version of the IACAC rules to decide whether the U.S. should enforce an award prior 
to the completion of foreign proceedings); see also DRC, Inc. v. Republic of Honduras, 
774 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying the Panama Convention to the parties’ 
agreement but reaching a contrary conclusion as to whether the U.S. should enforce 
an award prior to the completion of foreign proceedings.); accord Hernandez v. Smart 
& Final, Inc., No. 09-CV-2266 BEN NLS, 2010 WL 2505683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 
17, 2010) (the court states inaccurately that it need only use the FAA, and if there are 
any conflicts, only then look at the Panama Convention for guidance); Higgins v. SPX 
Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
53 9 U.S.C. § 305.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota S.A. E.S.P. v. Mercury Telco 
Group, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1361 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
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the Panama Convention should trump the New York Convention.58 
Second, they look to whether the applicable provisions of the New 
York Convention and the FAA are incorporated by reference into the 
Panama Convention.59 Finally, if the New York Convention’s provisions 
are incorporated into the Panama Convention, the court will apply and 
interpret the New York convention instead of the Panama Convention.60
Even after establishing the Panama Convention’s primacy over the 
New York Convention, U.S. courts continue to revert back to the New 
York Convention should they find that opting for the Panama Convention 
is unnecessary. It would be unnecessary if, for instance, the Panama 
Convention’s provisions incorporated the New York Convention and the 
FAA’s terms and the Panama Convention was meant to reach an identi-
cal outcome as the New York Convention.61 However, no court has yet 
found that the Panama Convention’s provisions deviated substantially 
58 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (recognizing other multi-lateral and bilateral arbitration 
treaties); 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (including both the New York Convention and the Panama 
Convention); 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-07 (stating the Panama Convention applies only when 
the parties the agreement are citizens of states that have ratified the Panama Convention 
and the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of states that are members of 
the OAS).
59 Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
60 Courts may decline to use the Panama Convention in situations where the 
Convention functions only to establish jurisdiction. See Figueiredo Ferraz Consultoria 
E Engenharia De Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 655 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009) (holding that while the Panama Convention “establishes jurisdiction in the 
United States as a signatory state through a venue statute appended to the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA), there remains the authority to reject that jurisdiction for 
reasons of convenience, judicial economy and justice”); see also Terminales Portuarios 
Termiport, S.A. v. Saxon Energy Services Del Ecuador, S.A., No. H-06-3565, 2007 
WL 4353711, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2007) (demonstrating that a court may also 
refuse jurisdiction when the U.S. is not involved in the dispute, even though the parties’ 
States are signatories of the Convention and members of the OAS).
61 H.R. reP. no. 501, at 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 675, 678. See 
also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 (1974) (stating “the goal of the 
Convention and principle purpose underlying American adoption and implementation 
of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration 
agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements 
to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries”). 
See e.g., Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota, 670 F. Supp. 2d at 1362.
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enough from the New York Convention and FAA’s terms to warrant an 
autonomous interpretation and application of the Panama Convention.62
The obligation of U.S. courts to apply the Panama Convention for 
certain disputes under 9 U.S.C. § 305 does not ultimately change the 
court’s use of the New York Convention.63 In Termorio S.A. E.S.P. v. 
Electranta S.P.,64 a contractor who had obtained an award in Colombia 
against a utility company owned by the Colombian government sought 
enforcement in the United States.65 The issue was whether the award 
could be enforced in the United States after the Colombian court had 
nullified it.66 The court held that it was unnecessary to discuss the 
Panama Convention because its codification incorporated, by reference, 
the relevant provisions of the New York Convention.67 This was so even 
though the court recognized that the Panama Convention applied to the 
dispute since Colombia is both a party to the Organization of American 
States and a signatory to the Panama Convention.68 In other words, not-
withstanding the Panama Convention’s indisputable applicability, the 
court deemed the use of the Panama Convention irrelevant.69
Another strain to the Panama Convention framework concerns the 
potential incorporation of the FAA’s terms. In Sanluis Developments, 
L.L.C. v. CCP Sanluis, L.L.C.,70 the court addressed the claimant’s 
motion to vacate an award by first finding that the Panama Convention 
applied.71 It then stated that the Panama Convention incorporates the 
62 Higgins v. SPX Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at *1 (W.D. Mich. 
Apr. 18, 2006); see Hernandez v. Smart & Final, Inc., No. 09-CV-2266 BEN NLS, 
2010 WL 2505683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2010) (stating inaccurately that the court 
need only use the FAA, and only in the event of conflict look at the Panama Convention 
for guidance).
63 The court confuses the two Conventions to the point where no distinction is made 
between the New York Convention and the Panama Convention. While the court 
points out that the Panama Convention applies, it cites several provisions of the New 
York Convention as if they were part of the Panama Convention. Int’l Transactions 
Ltd. v. Embotelladora Agral Regiomontana S.A. de C.V., No. 3:01-CV-1140-G, 2007 
WL 1944353, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2007).
64 TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 929 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 498 F. Supp. 2d 699, 702 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
71 Id.
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terms of the FAA unless the FAA conflicts with the terms of the Panama 
Convention under case law. 72 Therefore, the court revamped the same 
analysis as the aforementioned cases to conclude that the Panama 
Convention could be replaced not only by the New York Convention but 
also by the FAA.
A common misapplication of the Panama Convention is a leading 
trend in most cases involving enforcement of arbitral awards under this 
Convention.73 The statute clearly states that the Panama Convention is to 
be applied when certain conditions are met.74 Courts have misconstrued 
this statute by developing case law that instead favors the New York 
Convention and the FAA unless there are conflicts with the Panama 
Convention.75
ConClusIon
While U.S. federal courts and Congress have determined that the 
Panama Convention takes precedence over the New York Convention, 
these same courts frequently steer away from the Panama Convention, 
preferring instead the New York Convention or the FAA to examine dis-
putes technically falling within the purview of the Panama Convention. 
In this regard, U.S. courts seem to discuss the Panama Convention only 
so that they may apply New York Convention in resolving the interna-
tional commercial arbitration dispute at hand. The trend indicates that 
courts continue to treat the Panama Convention only as an extension 
of the New York Convention—particularly when analyzing disputes to 
compel arbitration, determine jurisdiction, and disputes over enforce-
ment of an arbitral award. This current interpretative trend shows little 
evidence of ever being overturned.
72 Sanluis Developments, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 702; Productos Mercantiles E 
Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 9 U.S.C. 
§ 307 (2011)).
73 Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 45; Hernandez v. Smart & Final, Inc., No. 09-
CV-2266 BEN NLS, 2010 WL 2505683, at *3 (S.D. Cal. June 17, 2010); Higgins v. 
SPX Corp., No. 1:05-CV-846, 2006 WL 1008677, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 18, 2006).
74 9 U.S.C. § 305 (1990).
75 Empresa De Telecommunicaciones De Bogota S.A. E.S.P. v. Mercury Telco 
Group, Inc., 670 F. Supp. 2d 1357 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (holding that the Panama 
Convention incorporates the FAA’s terms for confirming an award unless one of the 
grounds for refU.S.al or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award is found 
in the Convention); Sanluis Developments, 498 F. Supp. 2d at 702; Hernandez, 2010 
WL 2505683, at *3; Higgins, 2006 WL 1008677, at *1.
